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I. INTRODUCTION
American book and journal publishers sold 2.7 billion units in 
2014, generating $27.98 billion in net revenue.1 Meanwhile, libraries 
in the United States circulate almost twice that amount, engaging in 
over 4.42 billion circulation transactions a year,2 most of which are for 
free. Presumably, most of the works that libraries circulate are under 
copyright, and the Copyright Act grants to the owner of the copyright 
the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phono records of the 
copyrighted work to the public by . . . lending.”3 Nevertheless, libraries 
continue to circulate such a vast number of works, without seeking 
permission from the owners of the copyright or paying any royalties, 
because the first-sale doctrine, now codified in section 109(a), allows 
them to do that. Moreover, libraries benefit from the first-sale 
doctrine not only when they circulate materials, but also when they 
acquire them. The first-sale doctrine makes it easier for libraries to 
build their collections because those who sell them lawfully made 
copies do not need to obtain the copyright owners’ permission to do 
so. Thus, distributors and resellers of in-print books or out-of-print 
books, and owners of new books or used ones, can all sell, give, or lend 
them to libraries without worrying about copyright law.4 This 
ecosystem, where market-based remunerated transactions constitute 
only a subset of a much larger number of non-market and non-
remunerated transactions, has existed for generations—probably ever 
since publishers published books and libraries circulated them—and 
publishers have been doing just fine. 
But this ecosystem is currently under pressure. Rumor has it that 
the first-sale doctrine is dying.5 According to the rumor, the first-sale 
1 Marisa Bluestone, U.S. Publishing Industry’s Annual Survey Reveals $28 Billion in 
Revenue in 2014, ASS'N OF AM. PUBLISHERS, http://publishers.org/news/us-publishing-
industry%E2%80%99s-annual-survey-reveals-28-billion-revenue-2014 
[https://perma.cc/526T-8PA8]. 
2 Brief for Am. Lib. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1976). 
4 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1366 (2013). 
5 The analysis and critique of the “death prognosis” is based on Ariel Katz, Digital 
Exhaustion: North American Observations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE LAW 137 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016). 
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doctrine, forged in the era of the physical copy and limited to the 
distribution of physical copies, will lose its prominence in the brave 
new digital world, where works in digital formats are no longer 
distributed and enjoyed as particular identifiable objects.6 The first-
sale doctrine may not disappear altogether, but history may relegate it 
to the geriatric departments of culture and knowledge, together with 
yellowing used books, dusty records, and crumbling films.  
This “death prognosis” further relies on the proliferation of 
contractual and licensing conditions that purport to prohibit one 
buyer from transferring what she purchased to another, even if such a 
transfer were otherwise technically possible and legally permissible.7 
If those restrictive conditions are enforceable (and many assume they 
usually are), then the first-sale doctrine may be legally alive, but 
practically dead.  
If the death prognosis is accurate, it implies a rather dim future for 
libraries—at least as we know them. Libraries may not disappear 
altogether, but will slowly function less as libraries and more as 
archives. Or perhaps some of their functions will be taken over by 
commercial enterprises (imagine iTunes, Spotify, or Netflix for books 
or journal articles), or might require separate licensing arrangements. 
For this shift to happen, two propositions must be true. First, as a 
legal matter, it must either be the case that the that the first-sale 
doctrine applies only to physical copies and not to digital copies, or 
that the doctrine does apply to digital copies, but contractual and 
licensing limitations on the doctrine are unquestionably enforceable. 
Second, if commercial enterprises were to replace libraries, then, as an 
economic matter, business models that perform the functions that 
libraries currently perform must be viable.  
In this paper, I challenge both of these propositions. First, as a 
legal matter, the rumor of the doctrine’s demise, while taken for 
granted by many commentators, is far from being a foregone 
conclusion. Notwithstanding views to the contrary, the Copyright Act 
does not preclude courts from applying the principle of exhaustion to 
the transfer of digital files. Likewise, the general enforceability of 
contractual and licensing limitations on the doctrine should not be 
taken for granted. Second, as an economic matter, many of libraries’ 
6 Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Legislating Digital Exhaustion, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1535, 1539 (2014). 
7 Id. at 1539-44. 
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core functions address endemic market failures that will continue to 
persist even if most content were digitized. Therefore, the erosion of 
the first-sale doctrine may not result in new business models that 
better serve the public while remunerating authors, but may instead 
result in a net loss for all.  
The paper begins with a historical reminder: libraries and 
universities predate copyright. In Part I, I note that the institutional 
role of libraries and institutions of higher learning in the “promotion 
of science” and the “encouragement of learning” was acknowledged 
even before the first copyright statutes were enacted. This history is 
important for charting the future direction of copyright law because it 
constitutes part of the context in which copyright law was born and it 
helps illuminate the goals copyright was created to achieve. In Part II, 
I establish the plausibility of digital exhaustion. I explain why the 
first-sale doctrine is only one manifestation of a broader principle of 
exhaustion, which is not necessarily limited to the distribution right 
and is capable of broader application. In Part III, I explain why not all 
licensing or contractual restrictions on downstream uses are 
enforceable. In Part IV, I show how the social functions of libraries 
justify the development of the law in the direction argued for below.  
II. LIBRARIES PREDATE COPYRIGHT
Libraries and universities predate copyright. The institutional role 
of libraries and institutions of higher learning in the “promotion of 
science” and the “encouragement of learning” was acknowledged 
before legislators decided to grant authors exclusive rights in their 
writings. Beginning in the sixteenth century, the universities of 
Cambridge and Oxford (the only two English universities at the time) 
were entrusted “with the special privilege and authority of printing 
within their respective Universities, and of selling or causing to be 
sold throughout his Majesty's dominions or elsewhere all manner of 
books and works of whatever description, not prohibited by public 
authority, and whether the same may be or not contained or 
mentioned in any other Royal Charter or Grant to any other Printer”.8 
Not only were universities permitted to print and sell books regardless 
of any exclusive rights granted to others,9 but subsequent legislation 
also required publishers to deliver the best quality copies of every 
8 The Universities of Oxford & Cambridge v. Richardson, 31 ER 1260 (1802). 
9 DAVID MCKITTERICK, A HISTORY OF CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS xii (1992). 
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newly printed or reprinted book for the use of the public libraries of 
the universities.10 
Moreover, when the Statute of Anne, the first copyright act, was 
enacted in 1709, it included both a provision clarifying that it did not 
affect any right that the universities have had, or could claim to have, 
to the printing or reprinting of any book,11 and an expanded duty to 
deliver books to the libraries of the universities and other institutions 
in England and Scotland.12 The act also established a mechanism to 
control the prices of books if found to be “too high and unreasonable”, 
and it included the vice chancellors of the two universities among the 
group of public officials that could set the maximum price for which a 
book could be sold.13 In Cambridge University v. Bryer, the court 
10 See, e.g., Licensing Act, 1662, 5 Statutes of the Realm 428 1625-1680 (An Act for 
preventing the frequent Abuses in printing seditious treasonable and unlicensed Books and 
Pamphlets and for regulating of Printing and Printing Presses, 13 & 14 Car. 2, e. 33, ss. 16, 
17 (1662)).  
11 Statute of Anne, s IX (“Provided, that nothing in this act contained shall extend, or be 
construed to extend, either to prejudice or confirm any right that the said universities, or 
any of them, or any person or persons have, or claim to have, to the printing or reprinting 
any book or copy already printed, or hereafter to be printed.”). 
12 Statute of Anne, s V (“[A]nd it is hereby enacted, that nine copies of each book or books, 
upon the best paper . . . shall, by the printer and printers thereof, be delivered . . . for the 
use of the royal library, the libraries of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the 
libraries of the four universities in Scotland, the library of Sion College in London, and the 
library commonly called the library belonging to the faculty of advocates at Edinburgh 
respectively . . . ”). 
13 Statute of Anne, s IV (“if any bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, shall . . . set a 
price upon, or sell, or expose to sale, any book or books at such a price or rate as shall be 
conceived by any person or persons to be too high and unreasonable; it shall and may be 
lawful for any person or persons, to make complaint thereof to the lord archbishop of 
Canterbury for the time being, the lord chancellor, or lord keeper of the great seal of Great 
Britain for the time being, the lord bishop of London for the time being, the lord chief 
justice of the court of Queen's Bench, the lord chief justice of the court of Common Pleas, 
the lord chief baron of the court of Exchequer for the time being, the vice chancellors of the 
two universities for the time being, . . . who, or any one of them, shall and have hereby full 
power and authority, from time to time, to send for, summon, or call before him or them 
such bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, and to examine and enquire of the 
reason of the dearness and inhauncement of the price or value of such book or books by 
him or them so sold or exposed to sale; and if upon such enquiry and examination it shall 
be found, that the price of such book or books is inhaunced, or any wise too high or 
unreasonable, then and in such case the said [officials], or any one or more of them, so 
enquiring and examining, have hereby full power and authority to reform and redress the 
same, and to limit and settle the price of every such printed book and books, from time to 
time, according to the best of their judgments, and as to them shall seem just and 
reasonable . . . ”). 
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explained that both measures demonstrated the legislature’s intent to 
encourage learning by facilitating access to books. Price controls 
aimed to ensure the accessibility of literature to persons desirous of 
purchasing books, and mandatory library deposit of books enabled 
literary persons to access books even if they may not be able to afford 
purchasing them.14  
While today’s copyright statutes no longer contain these exact 
statutory provisions, this history is nonetheless important. First, 
because it constitutes part of the context in which copyright law was 
born and it helps illuminate the goals it was created to achieve.15 The 
public interest in gaining access to works has always been the main 
goal of copyright law,16 even if the means to achieve this goal might 
change over time.  
Second, as the case law discussed in the next Parts affirms, the 
copyright statute should not be interpreted as if it were written on a 
legal clean slate, but against the backdrop of previously existing or 
recognized rights and interests. Just as the statute presumably retains 
the substance of the common law rights of individuals,17 it should also 
presumably preserve the ability of public institutions to pursue their 
recognized mandate, unless there is a clear indication of legislative 
intent to the contrary.18  
Third, in countries such as Canada or the United States, this 
history might also affect the ability of federal legislation to enact 
copyright laws that impact the ability of libraries and educational 
institutions to pursue their mandates. While the Constitutions of both 
countries empower the federal legislature to enact copyright laws, 
principles of federalism limit the extent of these powers inasmuch as 
14 Univ. of Cambridge v. Bryer, 16 ER 317, 321 (1812). 
15 Id. (noting that even though the specific price-setting provision had been repealed, it was 
part of an entire Act, which shows that and facilitating access to works was one of the 
objectives of the legislation).  
16 See, e.g., Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”). 
17 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1353 (2013). 
18 Id. at 1374. 
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they intrude into subject matter that falls within provincial or state 
jurisdiction.19  
None of these considerations, of course, can directly determine the 
question of digital exhaustion—after all, one could search the law 
books in vain and would not find any case law predating the copyright 
statutes that explicitly recognizes a right to reproduce digital copies of 
books in order to transfer them to others. At the same time, however, 
one would equally fail to find a common law right to prohibit such 
reproductions, because there was no common law right to prohibit the 
reproduction of books at all. Ultimately, the question is whether the 
existing copyright statute prohibits such reproductions, and in 
answering this question history and the common law base lines could 
matter.  
But even if these considerations seem to offer only a limited 
doctrinal utility, they still carry considerable moral and rhetorical 
force. They remind librarians that the various acts that constitute 
“librarying” are not mere legal crumbs they were permitted to collect 
to the extent they fell off the copyright table. Rather, they reiterate 
that copyright law was never intended to hinder librarying, and that 
the public interest in the various social and cultural interactions that 
libraries facilitate was preserved and etched into the copyright system 
from its very beginning.  
This history, combined with the line of exhaustion cases, discussed 
below, teaches that the interpretative task in construing the scope of 
owners’ exclusive rights ought, among other things, to consider 
whether, to the extent that a copyright owner’s proffered 
interpretation interferes with the freedoms of libraries and their 
patrons, the legislature intended to impose such a limitation. In a 
similar vein, the Supreme Court of Canada recently held that the 
traditional balance between authors and users should be preserved in 
the digital environment, and that, absent evidence of legislative intent 
to the contrary, courts should interpret the Copyright Act “in a way 
that avoids imposing an additional layer of protections and fees based 
19 In Canada, for example, laws in relation to “property and civil rights”, or “education” fall 
under exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Thus, copyright legislation that unduly restricts 
what people can do with objects or devices that embody works of authorship (or how 
educational institutions carry out their mandate) might be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Jeremy F. de Beer, Copyrights, Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Canada’s Private 
Copying Levy, 51 MCGILL L.J. 735 (2005–2006) (discussing “property and civil rights”); 
Ariel Katz, Spectre: Canadian Copyright and the Mandatory Tariff - Part II, 28 IPJ 39, 
92–93 (2015) (discussing “education”). 
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solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user. To do 
otherwise would effectively impose a gratuitous cost for the use of 
more efficient, Internet-based technologies.”20  
These principles of statutory interpretation do not immediately 
solve the question of digital exhaustion, but they do clarify the 
baselines for the debate and the burdens of proof: libraries do not 
need to prove that the current copyright legislation intended to allow 
them to continue pursuing their mandate in the digital realm. Rather, 
copyright owners have to prove that the legislature intended to 
prevent libraries from so doing. To the extent that a broad 
construction of the reproduction or distribution rights (and a 
corresponding narrow construction of the first-sale doctrine) diminish 
the capacity of libraries to pursue their public mandate, and adapt it to 
the digital realities, these principles provide a juridical basis for 
rejecting such a construction.  
III. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF DIGITAL EXHAUSTION
A. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons: Life Beyond s 109(a)
In Capitol Records v. ReDigi,21 the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York adopted the view that the first-sale 
doctrine would not apply whenever the resale of a work in digital 
format requires a reproduction of the work. The holding had two 
prongs: first,that transferring a digital file from one medium to 
another constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act, even if there is no multiplication of copies;22 second, 
that the first-sale doctrine affords protection only against assertions of 
the distribution right but not against violation of other rights.23 The 
court also declined to entertain any interpretation of the Act that 
could allow digital first-sale. It held that the Act unambiguously 
precludes any such outcome, and concluded that an alternative 
interpretation would amount to an amendment of the Copyright Act, 
20 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada, 
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 231 ¶ ¶ 8-9 (Can.). 
21 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
22 Id. at 648. 
23 Id. at 655. 
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which is “a legislative prerogative that courts are unauthorized and ill 
suited to attempt.”24  
Yet, eleven days before the court handed down its decision in 
ReDigi, the Supreme Court decided Kirtsaeng, which casts doubt on 
the District Court’s unequivocal decision. Kirtsaeng did not involve 
digital exhaustion. The question before the Court in that case was 
whether the first-sale doctrine applied to copies made abroad and 
imported into the United States without the consent of the copyright 
owner. The majority held that it did, and their reasons are relevant to 
digital exhaustion as well. The majority, per Justice Breyer, 
emphasized that the first-sale doctrine does not owe its origin to the 
statute, and that Section 109 (and its predecessor in Copyright Act of 
1909) merely codifies the common law refusal to permit restraints on 
alienation, which harkens back at least to the early 17th century.25 This 
recognition, combined with the presumption that unless the contrary 
is evident “‘[s]tatutes which invade the common law…are to be read 
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and 
familiar principles,’”26 led the majority to reject an interpretation that 
would limit the scope of the first-sale doctrine to copies made in the 
United States.27 Likewise, Justice Kagan, in her concurring opinion, 
emphasized that the doctrine has played an integral part in American 
copyright law even prior to its codification.28  
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is equally instructive. She did not 
disagree with the majority’s general characterization of the doctrine 
and its non-statutory origin, and explained that the doctrine 
“recognizes that a copyright owner should not be permitted to exercise 
perpetual control over the distribution of copies of a copyrighted 
work.”29 Nevertheless, she was convinced that in 1976 Congress 
intended to exclude copies made abroad from the ambit of Section 
24 Id. 
25 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1361-63 (2013). 
26 Id. at 1363 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (omission by 
the Court)). 
27 For a survey of earlier cases applying exhaustion principles in the U.S., see Aaron 
Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 912-22 (2011). 
28 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1372 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
29 Id. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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109(a). She concluded, however, that the first-sale doctrine would still 
apply to such copies after the copyright holder authorized their 
importation. Even though she could not anchor this proposition in the 
statutory language, she reasoned, based on the statutory history, that 
the term “distribute” in Section 106(3) already incorporates the first-
sale doctrine. Acknowledging that this interpretation means Section 
109(a)’s codification of that doctrine adds little to the regulatory 
regime, she insisted that the section is not redundant, because it 
prevents courts from deviating from the doctrine in a way that 
increases copyright owners’ control over downstream distribution30 
and in some specific instances even expands the doctrine’s scope.31 
Therefore, even though the doctrine’s application to the importation 
of copies made abroad divided the Court, it appears (practically) 
unanimous that the first-sale doctrine has life beyond the words of 
Section 109(a).32  
Kirtsaeng affirmed that the basis of the first-sale doctrine is not 
statutory. The upshot of the opinions of both Breyer and Ginsburg is 
that people can resell, lend, or give away lawfully made books - not 
because Congress created a limited exception to the copyright owner’s 
distribution right, but because Congress had never intended to allow 
copyright owners the power to do so. 
Justice Ginsburg wrote that it was appropriate for the Court in 
Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus (the 1908 case articulating the first-sale 
doctrine), to hold that “Congress did not intend to permit copyright 
owners ‘to fasten . . . a restriction upon the subsequent alienation of 
30 Id. at 1387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 1387 n.20. Section 109 expands the scope of exhaustion beyond that recognized in 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). Bobbs-Merrill held that the copyright 
owner could not control sales beyond the first authorized sale. Id. at 350-51. Section 109, 
however, makes it lawful for the owner of a lawfully made copy to resell it, regardless of 
whether a previous authorized sale had taken place. See John A. Rothchild, Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property Rights and the Principle of Territoriality in the United States, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL IMPORTS 
226, 228 n.4 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2016). 
32 I say “practically unanimous” because Justice Scalia joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, 
but did not join this part of her decision. He did not, however, provide any reasons 
explaining his disagreement. Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation explicitly resorted to the 
doctrine’s pre-codified form in order to give the doctrine meaning not anchored in the 
codifying text, and the opinions of Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan are not inconsistent 
with this view.  
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the subject-matter of copyright’”33 even though the statute then did 
not include any such explicit limitation. Consequently, it would have 
been legitimate for the court in ReDigi to do the same.  
The line of patent exhaustion cases following Bobbs-Merrill 
supports the conclusion that the first-sale doctrine is only a species of 
a broader principle of exhaustion, and, as such, it is not necessarily 
limited to the distribution right. In Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,34 the Court 
declined to extend the holding of Bobbs-Merrill to patent law, 
emphasizing that Bobbs-Merrill dealt only with a copyright owner’s 
exclusive right to “vend”, not with a patentee’s exclusive right to “use” 
the invention.35 But five years later, in Motion Picture Patents v. 
Universal, the Court reversed Henry and held that the sale of a 
machine embedding a patented invention exhausts that patent 
owner’s exclusive right to “use” the invention, just as it exhausts the 
exclusive right to “vend” it.36 Indeed, the fact that Congress has never 
codified the principle of exhaustion in patent law provides additional 
evidence that the source of the doctrine is not statutory.37   
The significance of Kirtsaeng (and the line of previous exhaustion 
cases) lies in clarifying the baseline for understanding the scope of 
exhaustion as developed by the Court’s jurisprudence: copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights are a creature of statute, but users’ liberty of 
transferring ownership or possession of copies of books to others is 
not. Users can exercise this liberty not because Congress has chosen to 
exempt it from what otherwise would be prohibited, but because it 
never intended to limit it in the first place. These holdings reflect an 
established legal principle: Under the common law, every person is 
free to dispose of their possessions or carry on their business as they 
please in the absence of positive law limiting those freedoms. The 
legislature could limit those freedoms, but courts should not construe 
statutes to have such a limiting effect, unless the legislature has 
communicated its intent to depart from common law principles with 
33 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1386 (quoting Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 349–50). 
34 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
35 Id. at 46. 
36 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
37 While it could be argued that this is no longer true with respect to copyright, where 
Congress codified the doctrine, Kirtsaeng, as discussed above would not support this 
proposition.   
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irresistible clarity,38 and statutory grants that derogate from the 
common law rights of others ought to be construed narrowly.39 
B. Exhaustion Beyond Distribution 
Exhaustion’s death prognosis rests on the proposition that the 
first-sale doctrine limits only the scope of the distribution right and 
therefore becomes inapplicable the moment that a transfer of a work 
in a digital format requires its reproduction. Accepting this premise, 
the defendant in ReDigi developed technology that allegedly 
permitted users to transfer digital files without multiplying them, 
arguing that reproduction occurs only if copies are being multiplied. 
The District Court rejected that view and held that reproduction 
occurs whenever a work is embedded in a new material object, 
regardless of whether additional copies were made or not.40  
The Disctrict Court’s interpretation is questionable. It ignored 
dicta of the Supreme Court referring to the reproduction right as the 
right to multiply copies,41 and it refused to follow an earlier case, by 
another district court, involving transfer of ink from one medium to 
another where the court held that no reproduction occurred in the 
absence of multiplication.42 Instructively, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that reproduction indeed requires multiplication of 
38 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada v. T. Eaton Co., [1956] S.C.R. 610 (Can.); United 
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
39 See, e.g., THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE 
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291-92 
(John Norton Pomeroy ed., 2d ed. 1874). See also Ariel Katz, Intellectual Property, 
Antitrust, and the Rule of Law: Between Private Power and State Power, 17 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 633 (2016). 
40 Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
41 See, e.g., Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1852); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 
U.S. 339 (1998); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 362 (1908); Bong v. Alfred 
S. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236, 246 (1909); Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 
U.S. 182 (1909); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 46 (1912); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 
U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
42 ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (discussing C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 
189, 190 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
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copies, not merely new fixation, relying, among other things, on the 
same American case that the court in ReDigi rejected.43 
Nevertheless, the premise that reproduction necessarily renders 
the first-sale doctrine inapplicable is false, because it presupposes that 
when Congress codified the doctrine articulated in Bobbs-Merrill it 
intended to confine the principle to the distribution right and preclude 
its application to other rights. Without a clear indication that this was 
Congress’ intent, it is open for the courts to apply the principle of 
exhaustion to the various exclusive rights in the copyright bundle, not 
only to the distribution right. Therefore, the principle may encompass 
situations where reproduction is incidental to the transfer of a digital 
file.  
The evolution of exhaustion in patent law illustrates the point. In 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., a divided U.S. Supreme Court had initially 
declined to apply its copyright exhaustion holding from Bobbs-Merrill 
in the area of patent law, emphasizing the differences between the 
statutes.44 But this holding was short lived. The following year, the 
Court held that the exclusive right to vend had the same meaning 
under the patent and the copyright statutes, and that the scope of the 
right was the same; if the sale of a book exhausts the exclusive right to 
vend it, so does the sale of a patented machine.45 Shortly thereafter, 
the Court overruled Henry and applied the exhaustion principle not 
only to the exclusive right to “vend” the patented article, but also to 
the right to “use” it.46 Taken together, those decisions support the 
following propositions: (a) there are no major differences between the 
exhaustion of copyrights and the exhaustion of patents; (b) exhaustion 
of a patent is not limited to the right to sell it; (c) therefore, exhaustion 
43 See Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Can.) (the 
dissent interpreted the reproduction right exactly as the court in ReDigi did). 
44 Henry, 224 U.S. at 46 (explaining that while the copyright statute only grants an 
exclusive right to multiply and sell, the patent statute provides more extensive rights “to 
make, use, and vend the invention or discovery.”). Notably, when Henry was decided, 
Congress had already codified the first-sale doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909, but the 
fact that Congress only codified the exhaustion of the copyright owner’s right to vend, but 
not other rights, let alone any of the exclusive rights of patentees, played no role in the 
majority opinion.  
45 Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1912). As noted in note 44 with respect to 
Henry, the fact that exhaustion of the vending right under copyright law had been codified 
but Congress had not codified any of the rights of patentees also played no part in this case. 
46 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
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of copyright may also not be limited to the distribution right. The 
codified “first sale” doctrine may be limited to the distribution right, 
but the un-codified principle of exhaustion, of which it is only a 
subset, is not so limited.  
Moreover, as Perzanowski and Schultz demonstrate, American 
courts have applied the principle of exhaustion more broadly than as a 
limitation on the distribution right,47 and as I discuss elsewhere, the 
logic of exhaustion has animated various Canadian copyright 
decisions that narrowed the construction of the reproduction and 
public performance rights, respectively.48 
The most recent patent exhaustion case from the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Bowman v. Monsanto,49 may help draw some of the limitations 
on the broad application of the exhaustion principle. In that case, the 
Court held that the exhaustion doctrine in patent law does not permit 
a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting 
without the patent holder’s permission. The Court distinguished this 
case from other exhaustion cases on the grounds that it involved 
multiplication and replication of the patented item, and not merely its 
reuse. At the same time, the Court emphasized that the ruling does not 
imply a broader rule whereby multiplication would necessarily negate 
exhaustion, giving, as an example, instances where reproduction is a 
necessary but incidental step in using the item for another lawful 
purpose.50 In the case at hand, the defendant could not rely on 
exhaustion because he planted patented soybeans solely to make and 
market replicas of them, thus depriving the company of the reward 
patent law provides for the sale of each article.  
The same logic can apply to distinguish between situations where 
reproduction is merely a necessary and incidental step in the transfer 
of a digital copy of a work from one user to another—where 
exhaustion should apply—from instances where a user who purchases 
a single copy reproduces and distributes multiple copies in a way that 
directly competes with the sale of additional copies by the copyright 
47 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 27, at 912–22. 
48 Katz, supra note 5, at 152-56.  
49 Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
50 Id. at 1769 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) ("[I]t is not [a copyright] infringement for 
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another copy or adaptation of that 
computer program provide[d] that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential 
step in the utilization of the computer program")). 
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owner. In the first case, the incidental reproduction does not change 
the quantity of copies that are available in the market and can be 
enjoyed at any particular time—the quantum of simultaneous uses 
remains entirely dependent on the number of copies that the 
copyright owner has chosen to sell. Conversely, in the second case, the 
reproduction increases the number of such copies beyond the 
quantum chosen by the copyright owner.  
In sum, the first prong of the death prognosis—the premise that 
there can be no digital exhaustion because the transfer of digital file 
involves their reproduction—is false. The principle of exhaustion can 
be applied, and has been applied, broadly and is not limited to the 
distribution right.  
IV. THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE REORDERING
A. Exhaustion: Limits on Contract and License Override
The premise that license restrictions and contracts can override 
exhaustion constitutes the second prong of the death prognosis of the 
first-sale doctrine. Those who take this premise for granted do it at 
their own peril, because principle and legal precedent suggest 
otherwise. Over a period of ten years, beginning with Bobbs-Merrill in 
1908 and ending with Boston Store in 1918, the same Court decisions 
that established the doctrine of exhaustion also restricted the ability of 
IP owners to evade it using various techniques, including notices, 
license restrictions, and contracts.  
With respect to notices, Bobbs-Merrill made it clear that copyright 
owners cannot restrict the rights of buyers and expand the scope of 
their own rights by merely printing a notice in the book.51 It might 
seem straightforward that if a copyright owner lacks the power to 
control sales beyond the first authorized sale, it cannot assume this 
power by the mere act of posting a notice, but when the Court decided 
Bobbs-Merrill, the competing view seemed at least as plausible. 
Indeed, the same year the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bobbs-Merrill, 
the High Court of Australia was divided on the question of whether a 
patentee’s exclusive right to “vend” the patented article conferred 
upon it the power to maintain the resale price of the patented 
51 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908). 
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articles.52 The majority opinion in Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. v. 
Menck was remarkably similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bobbs-Merrill. However, on appeal, the Privy Council reversed and 
decided that “the general doctrine of absolute freedom of disposal of 
chattels of an ordinary kind is, in the case of patented goods, 
restricted when the patentee attaches conditions which the buyer 
becomes aware of at the time of sale.”53 The scope of exhaustion, 
under that view, depended entirely on the IP owner’s preferences. In 
the absence of an indication to the contrary, the patentee is presumed 
to have exhausted her right, but the right of buyers to dispose of what 
they had purchased could be taken away by mere notice of the 
patentee’s intention to restrict it. Any person having notice of such 
restrictions could be liable for infringing the patent if she violates 
them. 
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Henry followed the 
Privy Council decision in Menck.54 But shortly thereafter the Court 
overruled Henry in the concurrently decided cases of Motion Picture 
Patents and Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.55 In those cases, the 
Court held that the rights of a patentee under the patent statute did 
not include the power to impose restrictions on the use of a patented 
machine through license agreements or license notices. The Court, in 
these two decisions, also rejected the patentees’ attempts to avoid the 
consequences of exhaustion by describing the transactions they 
entered into with users not as “sales” of the patented machines, but as 
leases or licenses to use them.56 
The logic that animates the premise that license restrictions can 
override exhaustion is eerily similar to the logic that patentees 
promoted a hundred years ago. Back then, patentees claimed that 
since they had an exclusive right to “use” the invention, any use 
required their permission. This, in turn, enabled them to grant 
permission subject to conditions that allowed them to exercise 
52 Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl. v. Menck (1908) 7 C.L.R. 481, rev’d, Nat’l Phonograph Co. 
of Austl. v. Menck (1911) 12 C.L.R. 15 (PC) (appeal taken from Austl.). 
 
53 Nat’l Phonograph Co. of Austl., 12 C.L.R. at 21, 24. 
54 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 1, 42-43, 49 (1912). 
55 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515 (1917); Straus v. 
Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917). 
56 Id. 
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ongoing control over how devices that embodied their inventions 
could be used, even after they parted with them.57 They also argued 
that they could maintain control over the use of the machines they 
sold by describing the transactions as leases or licenses rather than 
sales.58 Today, copyright owners advance a similar logic by arguing 
that downloading or installing a digital file requires a license,59 and 
that describing these transactions as licenses rather than sales, 
overcomes exhaustion.60 Because they have no obligation to grant 
anyone license, and can refuse to grant one altogether, it must follow, 
pursuant to this logic, that they are entitled to grant restrictive 
licenses, including those that prohibit users from doing otherwise 
permissible activities. However, the Court rejected that logic and 
lower courts should decline the invitation to apply it.   
In sum, by 1917, the Court affirmed conclusively that the IP 
statutes did not confer upon the owners of patents and copyrights the 
power to control how the products embodying their inventions or 
works could be used or resold after they parted with them. Therefore, 
they could not arrogate to themselves such powers by purporting to 
reserve them through licensing restrictions. The Court emphatically 
rejected the notion that exhaustion was no more than a default rule 
that IP owners could reverse by providing notice of their intent to 
restrict it. Rather, the Court understood exhaustion as an integral 
component of the general legal order, which Congress did not intend 
to modify, and which IP owners were incapable of altering.61  
The plaintiffs in this line of cases alleged that when the various 
defendants violated the restrictive terms they purported to impose on 
users, these defendants were liable for copyright or patent 
57 See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 519 (Holmes, J., dissenting: “I suppose 
that a patentee has no less property in his patented machine than any other owner, and 
that in addition to keeping the machine to himself the patent gives him the further right to 
forbid the rest of the world from making others like it. In short, for whatever motive, he 
may keep his device wholly out of use . . . So much being undisputed, I cannot understand 
why he may not keep it out of use unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that, the buyer, 
will use some unpatented thing in connection with it.” Internal citation omitted). 
58 Id. at 515; Straus, 243 U.S. at 501. 
59 And under some views even executing it. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
60 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
61 See Katz, supra note 39, at 681. 
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infringement. The defendants prevailed in those cases because the 
Court held that the IP statutes did not confer the power to restrain the 
defendants from the acts complained about. Since the defendants did 
not infringe the IP rights, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any 
remedy that otherwise could be available to them had the IP rights 
been infringed. Therefore, these cases did not answer the question of 
whether contracts that contain the same or similar restriction could 
be relied on to limit exhaustion. In fact, in Bobbs-Merrill the Court 
noted there was no contract claim before it62 and emphasized that it 
was only dealing with the question of whether the copyright statute 
conferred the power to restrict subsequent sales and not with whether 
a contract restricting the same would be enforceable.63  
This, according to some, indicates that nothing in the Court’s 
jurisprudence supports the proposition that contractual restrictions 
on exhaustion will not be enforceable- implying that as long as the 
contract is otherwise valid, courts will enforce the restrictions.64 
However, in reality one can infer very little from the Court’s 
unsurprising failure to decide an issue that was not properly before 
it.65 The Court’s subsequent decisions provide more than solid 
indications that while some contractual limitations might be valid, 
others would not.66  
Three years after Bobbs-Merrill, the Court in Dr. Miles Medical 
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.67 held that contracts to maintain the 
resale price of proprietary medicines were invalid both at common law 
as unreasonable restraint of trade, and also under the Sherman Act.68 
The following year, the majority in the short-lived Henry v. A.B. Dick 
case held that Dr. Miles was inapplicable to the sale of patented 
62 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908). 
63 Id. at 350. 
64 See, e.g., John F. Duffy & Richard M. Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016).  
65 Ariel Katz, Aaron Perzanowski & Guy A. Rub, The Interaction of Exhaustion and the 
General Law: A Reply to Duffy and Hynes, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 8, 15 (2016).  
66 Katz, supra note 39, at 695-96. 
67 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  
68 Id. at 409. 
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goods.69 However, as noted, the Henry decision was short lived, and 
the vigorous dissent written by Chief Justice White became the view of 
the majority five years later.70 A year later in Boston Store of Chicago 
v. American Graphophone Co.,71 the Court discarded any remaining 
doubts that the general common law rules regarding contractual 
restraints on trade apply to the sale of patented articles or copyrighted 
works in the same way as they apply to other chattels.72  
Dr. Miles in subsequent years stood for the proposition that resale 
price maintenance constituted a per se antitrust violation: that is, a 
practice categorically prohibited, without inquiry into its actual effect 
on competition. In 2007, the Court overruled this aspect of that 
decision.73 However, the more general propositions that contracts 
purporting to exert downstream control over the sale or use of goods 
could be invalid at common law as unreasonable restraint of trade, 
and that the grant of a patent or copyright does not include the power 
to make contracts in derogation of that general law, remain valid.74 
Thus, the Court held that as a matter of federal antitrust law a 
restrictive contract will not attract antitrust liability unless it has been 
proven to restrain competition in a relevant market, but the contract 
may still be invalidated as unreasonable restraint of trade under the 
law of the relevant state.75 
B. Towards a Digital Restraint of Trade Doctrine
Noting that contracts attempting to limit exhaustion could be 
invalidated under the common law doctrine of restraint of trade does 
not imply, of course, that all such contracts would be invalid. The key 
question is whether the restraint is reasonable.  
69 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912). 
70 See supra Part II(B).  
71 Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918). 
72 Id. at 25. 
73 Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
74 Katz, supra note 39, at 693. 
75 Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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Generally, a reasonable restraint would be one that is merely 
ancillary to an otherwise legitimate contract and where it is “inserted 
only to protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the 
execution of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer from 
the unrestrained competition of the other.”76 If the restraint is not 
necessary for achieving the goal of the contract, or if it exceeds what is 
necessary to achieve that goal, it is void.77 Moreover, even if the 
restraint is no greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s 
interest, it might still be void if the harm to the promisor and the 
likely injury to the public outweigh the need of the promisee.78 
Like the first-sale doctrine itself, which the Court described as “a 
common law doctrine with impeccable historic pedigree”,79 the 
aversion to contracts in restraint of trade is one of the common law’s 
oldest and best-established doctrines.80 As a venerable common law 
rule, the doctrine of restraint of trade provides a heft of legal history 
along with flexibility and capacity to adapt to the realities of the digital 
realm. It also provides a useful framework for distinguishing 
situations where contractual limitations on exhaustion could be 
justified from those where they would not. Providing a thorough 
analysis of various contractual restraints and their validity would go 
beyond the scope of this essay (and post Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,81 the question might have to be decided as a matter of state 
law rather than federal law), but a few examples could illustrate the 
direction. 
Supporters of narrow exhaustion rules (and of extended freedom 
to contract around them) often argue that allowing copyright owners 
to control the downstream use of their works would allow them to set 
different prices for different users. Without the power to price 
discriminate, they argue, the copyright owner might elect to set a high 
uniform price, resulting in a lower quantity of distributed copies and 
76 U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir 1898). 
77 Id. 
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
79 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).  
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS CHAPTER 8 INTRO. NOTE (1981). 
81 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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the exclusion of consumers with a lower willingness or ability to pay.82 
If so, then greater control over downstream uses could be efficient; 
efficient both in the static sense of reducing the deadweight loss that 
may result from the grant of copyright, as well as efficient in the 
dynamic sense of allowing copyright owners to earn a higher profit, 
potentially increasing the incentive to create (even without improving 
static efficiency).83 
Elsewhere, I have discussed why the economics of price 
discrimination are more complicated than the above account: its 
benefits are not as straightforward, and exhaustion does not seriously 
threaten these benefits, when they exist.84 Even if copyright law does 
not allow publishers to control the resale of digital copies, publishers 
have options. They can still sell digital copies subject to reasonable 
post-sale contractual “sticks” to discourage resale, or offer “carrots” to 
induce the retention of copies if the speed and ease of digital resale 
proves detrimental.85 As long as (i) publishers’ inability to control any 
downstream use proves detrimental to the incentivizing goals of 
copyright law, (ii) they adopt limited contractual restraints that are 
narrowly tailored to counter this detrimental effect, and (iii) those 
restraints do not impose a greater harm on the access and 
dissemination goals of copyright law and on the freedoms of users, 
such contractual restraints could be held valid. At the same time, it is 
easy to see how restraints that are neither limited in time or scope, nor 
otherwise tailored narrowly to address a specific legitimate purpose, 
can do more harm than good, and should be invalidated.  
Opponents of digital exhaustion also argue that unlike used 
tangible copies that ordinarily wear out through use and repeated 
transfers from one user to another, digital copies remain pristine and 
perfect substitutes for the original. With the ease, speed, and global 
reach of Internet transmission, allowing digital exhaustion might 
threaten copyright owners’ profits on a level not experienced before.86 
82 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1390 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
83 Katz, supra note 5, at 145; see also, Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the 
Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. REV. 55, 77 (2014) [hereinafter First Sale 
Doctrine]; Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 775 
(2015). 
84 First Sale Doctrine, supra note 83, at 55; Katz, supra note 5, at 145-46, 164-66. 
85 Katz, supra note 5, at 165. 
86 Id. at 164 (and cited references therein). 
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Moreover, digital exhaustion sometimes invokes the specter of 
facilitating unbridled piracy because nothing prevents people who sell 
their digital copies from simultaneously retaining them.87 
These arguments rely on a series of plausible, but certainly not 
inevitable or incontrovertible, empirical predictions. They discount 
the myriad types of reasonable contractual restrictions that publishers 
could utilize, as well as the fact that publishers are better positioned 
than resellers to develop various strategies to compete with those 
resellers. For example, they can offer price-match guarantees, or they 
can discourage resellers by threatening to increase the supply of new 
copies, or they can offer bundles of work at a discount, and so on. 
Large and sophisticated resellers might offer their own inducements, 
but the copyright owner’s control over the release of new copies 
provides publishers with a strategic advantage over the reseller whose 
supply of used copies will always be depended on and affected by the 
actions of the copyright owner.88  
The specter of piracy-run-amok ignores the simple fact that as a 
matter of law a person who sells his copy but makes and retains 
another may still infringe copyright, and that as a practical reality, 
people who wish to evade the law do not need to masquerade as 
complying with first-sale rules when they can obtain illegal copies 
much more easily elsewhere.89 Moreover, even though it may be 
difficult to distinguish between a legitimate resale of a work in digital 
format and the sale of an illicit copy, law-abiding buyers of used works 
might prefer buying from reputable intermediaries ensuring the 
legitimacy of the transaction.90 Therefore, the ways in which 
recognizing digital exhaustion might increase the incidence of illicit 
copying are far from obvious. In fact, legitimizing second-hand 
markets for digital copies will allow individuals unable or unwilling to 
purchase new copies legitimately to buy used copies, which in turn 
reduces the demand for pirated copies. Such sales might not enrich 
copyright owners directly, but may benefit them indirectly, because 
consumers who know that they can resell the goods that they buy are 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 165. 
89 Id. 
90 See, e.g., Digitally Delivered Goods Policy, EBAY, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/downloadable.html [https://perma.cc/297U-K4PS].  
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more willing to buy them in the first place.91 Moreover, the history of 
copyright teaches us that dire predictions about the devastating effects 
of digital and other technologies are frequently raised but have rarely 
materialized.92 It’s true that the boy who cried wolf was eventually 
right, but it is also true that after repeated false alarms, the rational 
person becomes skeptical. 
But more importantly, even if digital exhaustion presents new and 
different challenges for publishers, the arguments against it tend to 
focus on the short-term benefits that may accrue to copyright owners 
if the doctrine could be eliminated, or on the challenges facing them if 
maintained. But these arguments critically ignore exhaustion’s long-
term benefit to the public, and the harms to the public that will result 
from eliminating or narrowing it.  
V. DIGITAL EXHAUSTION AND THE CASE OF LIBRARIES
The social benefits of exhaustion and the harms that may result 
from eliminating or restricting it are not limited to libraries, although 
libraries provide an excellent case for demonstrating them. How we 
assess those benefits and harms depends on our understanding of the 
role and function of libraries, and how libraries interact with, and 
impact upon, the commercial market activities of publishers. In this 
Part, I discuss why libraries exist, the various market failures that they 
mitigate, and why many of those market failures will likely persist 
even with the advent of more advanced business models for the 
dissemination of works in digital formats. 
A. Why Do Libraries Even Exist?
I opened this Article by highlighting the interesting fact that 
libraries engage in more transactions than publishers. I also noted 
that this ecosystem, where market-based remunerated transactions 
constitute only subset of a much larger number of non-market and 
non-remunerated transactions, has existed for generations—probably 
ever since publishers began publishing books and libraries began 
91 See e.g.,  Rub, supra note 83, at 782. 
92 Am. Broad. Companies v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2517–18 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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circulating them. How did this happen, and why has this equilibrium 
persisted? 
One possible answer is that this is a historical error which the law 
has failed to rectify; instead of relying on publicly funded institutions 
(bureaucratic, slow to adapt, facing no market discipline, and no 
incentive to innovate), we could have let publishers (and other 
commercial intermediaries) take their place. Not only will commercial 
enterprise develop business models providing the same social benefits 
that we ascribe to libraries, but they could also do it in more efficient 
ways. Moreover, by monetizing the billions of transactions that are 
currently free, a market-based provision of library services will 
generate more profit for authors and publishers and therefore will 
increase the incentive to create new works. But as long as the law 
allows libraries to provide those free services and taxpayers continue 
to subsidize the libraries providing them, publishers cannot compete. 
Under this view, libraries should be privatized, or, at the very least, 
copyright law should be reformed to prevent libraries from providing 
their free services.  
If this answer makes you jubilant, you can stop reading here. 
However, if you suspect that libraries provide services and play some 
roles that the market actors cannot or would not, then you may wish 
to continue reading.     
B. Libraries Mitigate a Web of Market Failures
All but the most extreme market-fundamentalist economists could 
easily explain that libraries constitute one of several institutional 
responses to the market failures inherent in the copyright ecosystem. 
Therefore, libraries operate in a space that commerce does not and 
will not occupy, and the services that libraries provide supplement 
rather than compete with services that publishers and other 
commercial intermediaries could offer. If so, then the legal rules that 
facilitate the functioning of libraries (such as exhaustion) are efficient 
at least insofar as they permit beneficial activities that otherwise 
would not exist. Those rules might still be efficient even if libraries 
and commerce might compete at the margins (e.g., if some readers 
choose to borrow a book from the library even if otherwise they would 
buy it), so long as overall the social benefit from activities they 
facilitate outweighs whatever harms they cause. However, like any 
type of cost-benefit analysis, the conclusion that libraries increase 
efficiency by mitigating market failure is contingent on the types of 
market failures that exist in any specific context. As technology and 
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business methods evolve, so may the existence or severity of different 
market failures. The cost of some market transactions might be 
prohibitively high under existing technologies, but new technologies 
or different organizational structures might reduce those costs and 
make it possible for new business models to emerge. If so, then 
recalibrating the respective roles of market and non-market 
institutions in the copyright system might be warranted.  
Note how this framing might imply that libraries be permitted to 
provide only those services that publishers would not provide, and 
that by default, commercial (and copyright-dependent) models ought 
to be preferred over non-commercial models or models that are 
otherwise not based on copyright and exclusion. But this would be 
erroneous because copyright itself is an imperfect solution to a 
perceived market failure. Therefore, there is no a priori reason to 
privilege copyright-based models over other models for providing 
access to information. In fact, if services can be provided in ways that 
do not require incurring the social costs of copyright exclusion, a 
strong case can be made in their favor.   
C. Technology Contingent, Endemic, and Strategic Impediments to 
Access
Consider the most typical of the activities of libraries: the lending 
of books. Some readers might prefer borrowing a book from a library 
to buying because its price exceeds their willingness or ability to pay, 
or because the book is out of print or otherwise not available for 
purchase in the relevant market (e.g., a book in a foreign language). In 
both cases, the fact that people borrow the book demonstrates that 
there is demand for the book that commercial market players (i.e., 
publishers or other commercial intermediaries) fail to supply. But why 
do publishers forego what seems like considerable missing business 
opportunities, and why do libraries occupy that space instead? 
Understanding what causes the mismatch between demand and 
supply by commercial entities is crucial for evaluating the respective 
roles of publishers, libraries, and the laws that regulate their activities.  
Impediments to universal access to books can be classified into 
three general categories: technologically contingent impediments, 
endemic impediments, and strategic impediments. Technologically 
contingent impediments reflect the cost of printing, distributing, and 
storing the book (production costs). They also include the costs 
associated with running the business models under which those 
activities are pursued. Improvements in the costs of production may 
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result in an increase in market-based provision of access. Endemic 
impediments to market provision reflect the public good nature of 
information and the inherent difficulties in determining the value of 
acquiring it. As a result, technological improvements are less likely to 
affect them. Lastly, strategic impediments result from the exercise of 
market power by publishers, which allows them to profit more by 
limiting production even if profitable production were otherwise 
feasible. I address those categories in more detail below. 
1. Technology Contingent Impediments
Production costs affect how many books will be produced and 
sold; for any given demand curve, higher production costs would 
entail fewer books that will be produced and sold, and lower 
production costs will result in more books will be produced and sold. 
This suggests that when production costs are high, more people will 
depend on libraries for access, and when production costs decrease, 
the resulting lower prices will lead more people to buy their own 
copies instead of borrowing them from a library. For example, before 
the invention of the printing press, books were so expensive that not 
only were they beyond the reach of all but the wealthiest people, even 
if they were available in libraries, they were often chained to library 
desks and could not be borrowed.93 The printing press, by reducing 
the cost of printing, made books more affordable and their supply 
increased accordingly.94 With further technological improvements, 
production costs decreased and supply increased.  
However, the decline in the production costs (and prices) of books 
also means that libraries could purchase and lend even more books. 
The volume of such library transactions raises the question of why 
publishers (or other commercial intermediaries) don’t seize the 
opportunity and offer their own for-profit library alternatives? The 
question already betrays an answer: the volume of library transactions 
may be high, but many of those transactions may not be profitable 
inasmuch as the cost of providing them exceeds the money that users 
might be able or willing to pay for them. Libraries, in this regard, 
resemble other business models based on the sharing of existing 
assets, such as the rental of homes or cars. Just as a car rental 
93 See generally JOSHUA GANS, INFORMATION WANTS TO BE SHARED (2012). 
94 Id.  
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company allows people to drive a car even if they do not buy it, a 
library allows readers to borrow and read a book that they do not wish 
or cannot afford buying. The difference, however, between libraries 
and publishers or other commercial entities, is that, unlike libraries, 
these commercial entities will only provide sharing and other library 
services if those services could be profitable. Publicly funded libraries 
could offer those services even when they are not.  
If this explanation provided the full answer to why libraries exist, 
it would be highly contingent on the technology of providing those 
services. New technologies and innovative business models may 
reduce production costs and create opportunities to profit from 
providing access to books. Technological advancements that reduce 
the costs of producing and selling books will tend to increase the sale 
of books and reduce the demand for and incidence of borrowing. 
Other technological changes may not only result in greater sharing, 
but might also induce entry of other players into the sharing space. 
Imagine, for example, an Uber-like service for book sharing, where 
instead of searching the catalog of the local library, people can search 
an online catalog of books that their neighbors are willing to lend 
them. 
Likewise, changes in production costs can affect the incidence of 
borrowing out of print books. Assuming that the demand for older 
books is lower than the demand for newer books, and that the 
distribution and printing costs remain the same, publishers will 
rationally prefer using their limited resources for producing newer 
and more profitable books. Publishers will not print older books 
unless the expected revenue from their sale exceeds the cost of 
producing them. However, lower production costs might change the 
value proposition of older books: more of them might be printed and 
sold, and relatively fewer might be borrowed from libraries.  
2. Endemic Impediments
Some impediments to market provision of access to books are 
more endemic and less contingent on the technology of production. 
Efficient market provision requires that actors have enough 
information on the costs and benefits of transacting, and that they 
fully internalize those costs and benefits. If buyers cannot determine 
the benefit of entering a transaction, or if some of the costs and 
benefits are borne by others (what economists call “externalities”), 
then market equilibrium will not reflect the social optimum. 
Therefore, a lack of information, together with externalities, may lead 
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to market failure, and the creation of further endemic impediments to 
efficient market provision of access to books which technological 
advances cannot easily cure. 
Books and other information goods present both of these 
problems. First, readers cannot fully ascertain the value of reading a 
book before they read it, and oftentimes even long after. In some 
cases, a book that seems promising turns out to be disappointing. In 
other cases, the value of what the reader learns today may only 
materialize fully when connected with knowledge obtained later, or 
when shared with other people. These unknowns present a pricing 
problem for readers and publishers. Readers struggle to determine 
whether the benefit from reading the book justified the cost of buying 
it, (and therefore forego at least some transactions for which the price 
seems too high ex ante). Publishers, facing readers with varying 
preferences, may find it difficult to determine an optimal market price 
(and therefore set a price that, for some readers at least, would be too 
high). Moreover, externalities compound these problems. A reader 
can only expect to internalize some of the social value of the 
knowledge she acquires, but not all of it. This is especially so when the 
reader acquires this information in order to share it with others (e.g., 
a teacher, researcher, a worker, or a manager). This is one aspect of 
knowledge being a public good. The benefits that accrue to others are 
positive externalities, which a reader will rationally ignore when 
deciding whether to pay for a book. In a similar vein, a profit-
maximizing publisher will decide what to publish and at what price to 
sell it only on the basis of what maximizes its profit today or in the 
near future, and not on the basis of what maximizes social welfare in 
the long run.95  
Public libraries that provide free or heavily subsidized access to 
books reduce the social cost of these market failures and partially 
mitigate those endemic impediments to access. By allowing readers to 
access books for free, they improve the net benefit for the reader and 
thus increase readership towards the socially optimal level. Moreover, 
since their mandate reflects the long-term benefits of their 
communities and their funding depends on the public, public libraries 
95 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 801, 812–13 (2009–2010). 
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are more capable of providing access to books in a way that 
approximates society’s long-term benefits.96  
3. Strategic Impediments
The third type of impediments to access is strategic and reflects 
publishers’ choices to limit access to books in order to maximize 
profit. I refer to these impediments as strategic because unlike the 
previous two types of impediments, which are exogenous to 
publishers’ decisions, strategic impediments are fully dependent on 
publishers’ choices. Strategic impediments result from and reflect 
publishers’ market power, which allows them to increase profit by 
reducing output below the technologically feasible, and economically 
viable, level.  
Copyright is one of the key factors affecting the price and 
availability of books. By limiting competition from other producers of 
the same book, the publisher can set the price at a supra-competitive 
level and earn a higher profit by reducing the quantity of copies 
available. As a result, people who are willing to pay a price that is 
higher than the cost of production but lower than the monopoly price 
are excluded from the market. This deadweight loss is not an 
unforeseen consequence of copyright, but an acknowledged cost of 
granting it.97 If copyright works as intended and drives the prices of 
books above the cost of their production, then the resulting unmet 
demand is independent of the technology of production and 
distribution. In other words, copyright, by design, leads to artificial 
scarcity, and therefore as long as there is copyright, institutions that 
mitigate the resulting deadweight will serve a purpose.98  
In addition to limiting the supply and raising the price of printed 
books, copyright may also allow publishers to strategically limit or 
prevent the supply of older books. Since in many cases the marginal 
reader may regard an old book as a close substitute for a new book, 
96 The funding of libraries might still be lower than the optimal because the taxpayers that 
ultimately fund them might still prefer spending public money on purposes with more 
tangible and shorter-term benefits, and on those that benefit members of the immediate 
community over those that benefit society at large.  
97 Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market 
Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 841 (2007). 
98 Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property As Price Discrimination: Implications For 
Contract, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1388 (1998). 
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increasing the supply of older books might have the same depressing 
effect on the price of new books as printing a larger quantity of the 
new book. Therefore, many older books are out of print and 
unavailable not only because the cost of supplying them relative to the 
demand for them makes their production non economical, but 
because copyright allows publishers who hold large portfolios of 
copyright to strategically choose which books to continue producing, 
and which books to suppress.99    
Therefore, when impediments to market based provision of access 
to books are strategic, libraries may reduce the resulting deadweight 
loss by facilitating access to those books. Libraries can do this because 
copyright law permits libraries to provide certain forms of access 
without the copyright owner’s permission.  
D. Price Discrimination and Impediments Thereto
The copyright explanation is incomplete, however, because while 
copyright allows publishers to price books at a supra-competitive 
level, copyright law also allows copyright owners to implement price-
discrimination schemes that could generate even higher profits.100 If 
the copyright owner could charge the higher monopoly price to those 
who are willing to pay it, and set a lower price for those who are not, 
then not only will the copyright owner be able to earn even higher 
profits (meaning greater incentive to invest in the first place), it would 
be achieved with no, or at least smaller, deadweight loss. In cases 
where a monopolist could charge every user a price that corresponds 
to that user’s ability or willingness to pay, the monopolist will produce 
the same quantity that will be available under perfect competition 
while earning much higher profits.101  
In order to price-discriminate, the seller must have: (i) some 
market power (i.e., power to set the prices above the marginal cost of 
production, which copyright, by preventing other producers from 
producing the same book, usually confers); (ii) an ability to have 
99 See generally Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 829. 
100 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 98. 
101 James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, Or Lavish - Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and 
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2025–26 (2000); see also Rub, 
supra note 83, at 766. 
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sufficient information about users’ preferences and willingness and 
ability to pay combined with the ability to sort them out accordingly; 
and (iii) an ability to prevent arbitrage: that is, to prevent a user who 
purchased the good at a lower price from reselling it to another user 
who would otherwise be willing to pay a higher price to the copyright 
owner.  
Digital technologies promise greater potential for profitable price-
discrimination insofar as they can improve the ability to gather 
information on users and offer a more finely-tuned array of products, 
services, and prices to match heterogeneous demand. From this 
perspective, exhaustion could be seen as presenting a serious 
problem: it reduces the copyright owner’s power to prevent arbitrage 
because it makes it lawful for a person who purchased a book at a 
lower price to resell it to another reader who would otherwise be 
willing to pay a higher price. Further, it facilitates secondary markets 
of used books that can be sold in competition with the higher-price 
offerings of the publisher. In addition, by permitting resale 
transactions that do not require the copyright owner’s permission, 
exhaustion interferes with the copyright owner’s effort to collect 
information on its users. Those who believe that ubiquitous price 
discrimination creates a strong incentive to create and disseminate 
new works are inclined to endorse the view that (a) exhaustion should 
not apply to the transfer of digital files, and (b) even if it did apply, 
copyright owners should be able to circumvent it using technological 
means, license restrictions, or contracts. In the same vein, they might 
tend to see the library (and its reliance on exhaustion) as an 
institution that might have mitigated the market failures of yore, but 
whose continued existence is obsolete at best, and at worst represents 
a threat to the growth of new business models.  
Earlier critics of these views assumed that this model of ubiquitous 
price discrimination is indeed possible, though some of them have 
questioned whether it is also desirable.102 They questioned, for 
example, the overly optimistic, and sometimes simplistic, assumptions 
that proponents of the ubiquitous price-discrimination vision make,103 
and highlighted that the move from one regime to another is not 
necessarily value neutral104 and may influence the type of works that 
102 See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); 
Gordon, supra note 98. 
103 Cohen, supra note 102, at 1809-10. 
104 Boyle, supra note 101, at 2027. 
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are created and used.105 Others have noted that price discrimination 
does not necessarily result in greater output, and might result in less 
access, rather than more.106 
I would like to add to this debate by focusing on the type of 
information that would be necessary to implement ubiquitous price 
discrimination, whether gathering it is possible, and why publishers 
might strategically choose not to implement the vision of ubiquitous 
access-maximizing price discrimination, even if they could. This 
discussion will reveal that there are some endemic impediments to 
efficient price discrimination, as well as some strategic reasons why 
publishers might refrain from implementing it, even if they could. 
This discussion will also provide important insights about why some 
of the roles of libraries are economically indispensable, while other 
roles are politically crucial.  
In order to implement a system of efficient and ubiquitous price 
discrimination that achieves the optimistic vision for which its 
proponents advocate, publishers should be able to amass large 
amounts of information on users, which users might have very little 
incentive to supply, good reasons to keep private, or at least disclose 
strategically (i.e., to provide information they believe the publisher 
will interpret as signaling low willingness or ability to pay). However, 
even if users were willing to candidly provide full information, the 
information would still be incomplete, because users themselves may 
not know what they will learn from reading a book they have not read, 
or what utility they might derive from it. Moreover, even if the 
publisher were willing to take the information that the user provides 
at face value (which they should not) before setting a price, a rational 
publisher would still need to interpret the information. But the more 
idiosyncratic the individual user’s preferences and intended use are, 
the more difficult and prone to error is the task of setting a “correct” 
individual price.  
Furthermore, many limitations on copyright permit users to 
engage in activities that benefit not only the users themselves, but also 
third parties and society at large. These users, however, can expect to 
internalize only part of the social benefits arising from their activities 
and will not take into account the positive spillovers conferred on 
105 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
387, 448 (2007–2008). 
106 See e.g., Guy A. Rub, Contracting around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling 
of Rights in Creative Works, U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 268 (2011). 
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others. For example, a reader may buy a book and then decide to write 
a critique of it; or the book may inspire her to write additional works. 
If that reader has to pay for the right to criticize the book or for the 
right to be inspired by it, her willingness to pay will reflect only the 
private value that she might expect to derive from these activities, but 
not the value that her activities will generate to others.107 Copyright 
owners ignore those positive spillovers as well and would be especially 
reluctant to permit uses that might harm their own interests. Or, 
copyright owners might strategically exploit situations of hold-up to 
extract the highest licensing fees possible. Consequently, even if 
publishers could implement mechanisms that provide access to all 
readers, the terms of those transactions will not result in a socially 
optimal equilibrium.108 
Strategic reasons might also deter publishers from implementing 
less-than-perfect price discrimination. As noted above, publishers 
may choose to keep older books out of circulation for strategic 
reasons, rather than cost-related reasons. In addition, while digital 
technologies provide tools that could be used for more effective price 
discrimination, they also create unique strategic challenges. For 
example, large-scale printing technologies typically involve 
considerable set up costs, which compel the publisher to determine in 
advance the number of copies in each print run. Printing additional 
copies would entail incurring the set up costs again (as well as the 
opportunity cost of printing this book rather than another book), and 
the publisher will only incur them if it expects that the demand for the 
additional run will generate enough profit to cover those costs. Even 
though the information embodied in the book is non-rivalrous, the 
book itself is rivalrous and the limited quantity of printed copies 
forces the buyer to reveal how much she values the book (or at least 
she values getting a copy of the book more than other potential buyers 
against whom she is bidding).  
This is not the case with fully digital books, such as e-books, where 
the marginal cost of producing another copy or authorizing another 
use is close to zero, and where communicating with any potential user 
is easy. These features entail that once the publisher produces a digital 
copy of a work, it effectively has the capacity to supply the entire 
107 Frischmann, supra note 95. 
108 First Sale Doctrine, supra note 83, at 107-08. 
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demand for it.109 As a result, selling or licensing a digital book to one 
person does not diminish the opportunity to sell it to another. Since 
users are no longer bidding over a resource with finite quantity, there 
are fewer reasons for them to reveal how much they are willing to pay, 
and greater reasons to stall and pretend to be a marginal consumer 
further down the demand curve, who values the work just slightly 
above the marginal cost of its production. Having built the capacity to 
supply the entire demand, the publisher cannot credibly threaten not 
to sell or to sell to someone else and should, in theory, be willing to 
accept any price above zero. The key difference between the printed 
book and the e-book in this regard is that the traditional technology of 
printing results in scarcity (at least temporarily), which allows 
publishers to reliably commit to selling the book at prices that exceed 
marginal costs. In contrast, there is no equivalent technological 
impediment to producing another e-book instantly.110 Paradoxically, 
the very conditions that make the online provision of digital goods so 
amenable to ubiquitous price discrimination can also make it 
unattractive for publishers to so discriminate.111  
If we assume that publishers can implement perfect price 
discrimination (not near perfect, but perfectly perfect) then we 
assume away these challenges. So let’s imagine, that sophisticated big 
data tools will allow publishers to create a precise profile of every user 
that will not only determine that user’s precise preferences, but also 
predict their social utility with perfect accuracy, without being tricked 
by any attempt to pretend to have a lower willingness to pay. And if we 
take the promise of perfect and ubiquitous price discrimination 
seriously, we should also contemplate harnessing the power of the 
state to ensure that the collected data is both complete and accurate, 
and that attempts to undermine the system by not providing 
publishers full and accurate disclosure of all necessary data or through 
arbitrage will not be tolerated. In other words, accomplishing the 
optimistic vision of ubiquitous price discrimination might involve 
109 This may also be true for digital print-on-demand.  
110 This type of pricing challenge is reminiscent of the pricing challenges that monopolists 
selling durable goods face. See generally R.H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & 
ECON. 143 (1972); Barak Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-
Goods Markets, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (2004). 
111 This might explain, at least in part, publishers’ reluctance to embrace e-books and why 
the resorted to various techniques, some of them illegal, in their attempt to prevent the sale 
of cheap e-books. See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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intrusive surveillance mechanisms that can seem decidedly 
Orewllian.112 One may notice that a capitalist’s ideal of ubiquitous 
price discrimination resembles the utopian socialist “from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, not only in 
their outcome, but also in the means that might be necessary to 
accomplish them.113 
The dependency of ubiquitous price discrimination schemes on 
intrusive surveillance demonstrates that historically libraries have 
offered not only access to books, but have also endeavored to provide 
access under conditions that guarantee readers’ privacy and freedom 
from surveillance. To the extent that readers value the ability of 
reading without being watched, libraries offer them a service for 
which the market cannot, or may not, easily substitute. Moreover, 
because readers cannot internalize the entire social benefits that stem 
from an environment that enables this kind of free inquiry, they may 
rationally waive their privacy in return for more immediate and 
tangible commercial offerings. Therefore, to the extent that society has 
an interest in preserving an environment that promotes free, 
anonymous, and private inquiry, libraries and the legal rules that 
enable their operation are worth keeping, even if the market could 
otherwise provide seemingly comparable services.114  
E. Alternatives to Direct Price Discrimination
If amassing the data required for implementing perfect or near-
perfect price discrimination now seems impossible, or if we consider 
the necessary conditions for it undesirable, then publishers could still 
resort to other forms of price discrimination. They could offer a menu 
of options for accessing works, catering to readers with different 
112 Christina M. Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 GA. 
L. REV. 1121 (2016). See also Boyle, supra note 101, at 2034 (“Perfect price discrimination 
requires more information about customers than can be revealed by mere self-selection 
and more information-gathering (to prevent illicit arbitrage, lending, or gifts). Do we really 
want to commit ourselves to a regime that will offer companies major assistance in the 
form of state power, assistance that will yield them big bucks, but only if they monitor their 
customers superlatively well? This seems like a rather perverse set of incentives.”). 
113 But with a major difference, as Oren Bracha reminded me: proponents of ubiquitous 
price discrimination tend to conflate the concepts of “needs,” “willingness to pay,” and 
“ability to pay.”  
114 See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at 
“Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996). 
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preferences and letting readers reveal their preferences by choosing 
the version that suits them best (economists often refer to this as 
second degree price discrimination). Alternatively, publishers can 
offer a single version of the work, but charge prices on the basis of 
easily observable characteristics that serve as a proxy for willingness 
or ability to pay (economists often refer to this as third degree price 
discrimination).  
Publishers have used these methods for years. For example, the 
difference in price between hard cover and paperback typically 
exceeds the difference in the cost of production, and their sequential 
release serves as a method for second-degree price discrimination: 
eager and more affluent readers may rush to buy the hard cover 
edition, while less eager or less affluent readers might wait for the 
paperback. The higher durability of hard cover books may also make 
them more appealing to libraries because it reduces the wear and tear 
that may result from the circulation of the copy among different 
readers, and libraries might be willing to pay a premium for this 
additional functionality. Discounts offered to students and seniors 
(which presumably earn less and have lower ability to pay) are a 
common form of third degree price discrimination, because those 
characteristics can be easily observed or at least verified.  
While perfect price discrimination could, in theory, maximize both 
access and profit, other types of price discrimination could increase 
profit (otherwise publishers wouldn’t implement them voluntarily) 
without resulting in full or even greater access, compared to the level 
of access under uniform pricing, let alone when the role of non-market 
access (e.g., through libraries) is counted. Therefore, even considering 
only the narrow economic question of how many people gain access, 
imperfect price discrimination is not a priori preferable to other 
mechanisms.  
There are three additional techniques that have enabled 
publishers to indirectly accomplish outcomes equivalent to those 
under direct price discrimination: the first is through the bundling of 
content, the second is through permitting or tolerating sharing of 
content among users, and the third is through a combination of both. 
As the next section shows, publishers employ these techniques 
routinely, and in many cases, libraries form part of the ecosystem that 
enables them.  
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F. Indirect Price Discrimination: Bundling, Sharing, and Libraries
The bundling of content in a single object (e.g., an issue of a 
newspaper or a magazine) or in a license that pertains to different 
works (e.g., subscription to a bundle of cable channels, or a database 
of journal articles, or a streaming services such as Netflix) allows the 
content provider to achieve the effect of price discrimination without 
needing to know how different consumers value different works. 
Bundling achieves this result because, even though readers’ tastes, 
preferences, and willingness to pay with respect to individual works 
will vary significantly, their willingness to pay for a bundle tends to 
average out.115  
For example, imagine two brothers, Jacob and Esau. Both like to 
be informed about what is going on in the world, but they have 
somewhat different interests and preferences: Jacob spends more 
time on op-eds than on news, while Esau does the opposite. In 
addition, Jacob likes to read articles on food and style, while Esau 
prefers stories about hunting and adventures (though he will not miss 
a recipe for good lentil stew). If the publisher of Canaan Times could 
determine exactly how much each of them is willing to pay for each 
article, it could maximize profit by setting such individual prices and 
selling individual articles accordingly- but obtaining such information 
is nearly impossible.116 However, the price that each of them is willing 
to pay for a bundle that includes various articles tends to average out, 
regardless of the variance in their respective preferences for individual 
articles. Therefore, bundling the different article in an issue of the 
newspaper makes it easier for the publisher to predict how consumers 
will evaluate a collection of works, without needing to know how they 
value any individual work.117 
The publisher can combine this strategy with other indirect forms 
of price discrimination. For example, if Esau, the farmer and hunter 
who never went to university, is less affluent than his erudite brother, 
115 See Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, 
and Efficiency, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1613 (1999). See also GANS, supra note 93, at 27. 
116 News articles, and most other copyrighted works are experience goods, meaning that 
buyers cannot ascertain their quality before buying them. This makes per-work per-user 
pricing even more challenging. 
117 See, e.g., Ariel Katz, Commentary: Is Collective Administration of Copyrights Justified 
by the Economic Literature?, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(Marcel Boyer et al. eds., 2009).  
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then offering the bundle at a discount to members of the Hunters and 
Farmers Association could increase the publisher’s profit.  
Now, suppose that Esau, after settling in Edom, prefers The 
Edomite to the Canaan Times as his main source of information, but 
is still interested in reading the Canaan Times occasionally. At the 
same time, the educated Jacob, who generally prefers the Canaan 
Times, enjoys reading stories from The Edomite now and again. Each 
of them would be happy to subscribe to both newspapers, but the full 
price of a subscription to The Edomite exceeds Jacob’s marginal utility 
from reading that newspaper—and vice versa with respect to Esau 
paying for a subscription to Canaan Times. If the publisher of The 
Edomite offered Jacob a substantial discount on a subscription, Jacob 
would buy it, and Esau would do the same with respect to the Canaan 
Times. However, the cost of determining what the prices should be 
and of maintaining a system for such differential pricing exceeds what 
each of the publishers could gain from implementing it.  
Moreover, their inability to afford subscribing to another 
newspaper does not really prevent the brothers from reading articles 
from the other newspaper because they often share them: once a 
month Jacob sends the used issues of the Cannan Times to Esau, and 
Esau does the same with his used issues of The Edomite. And 
occasionally, they might even scan selected articles of special interest 
and email them to each other so that they can be read much sooner; 
or, they simply email links to articles from the online edition of the 
newspapers (their respective lawyers advised them that the first-sale 
doctrine allows them to mail the used issues to each other, that 
reproducing and emailing the occasional article will likely qualify as 
fair use under the circumstances, and that emailing a hyperlink does 
not normally give rise to any copyright concerns). 
Although this arrangement may not be as convenient as being fully 
subscribed to a second newspaper, the brothers find this solution 
satisfactory. Moreover, each of them also realized that this sharing 
allows them to maintain their otherwise complicated relationships, 
and that by being able to share their newspapers with each other their 
respective subscriptions became more valuable to them: so much so, 
that even though both of them were hit by the Great Recession and 
had to reduce their expenses, the brothers—unlike some readers who 
cancelled their subscriptions (and had to be induced with significant 
discounts to re-subscribe)—retained their respective subscriptions.  
When the publisher of the Canaan Times decided to charge for full 
access to its online edition, limit the number of articles that non-
subscribers could access, and offer an online-only subscription that 
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costs less than full or print-only subscription, Esau considered buying 
the online-only subscription, but the price was still too high for him. 
Jacob, however, was happy to upgrade his subscription and get the 
full print-plus-online version, and share his login credentials with his 
brother.  
Not only did the various ways in which the brothers legally shared 
newspaper articles not hurt the publishers, they probably benefited 
them financially because the unpaid sharing increased each of the 
brothers’ willingness to pay for the content they paid for, and allowed 
the publishers indirectly to achieve an outcome similar to those under 
direct price discrimination without incurring the costs that setting up 
direct price discrimination schemes demand. Moreover, these 
beneficial outcomes are possible because copyright law permits them.  
Publishers routinely sell or license content in ways that are 
consistent with the economics of bundling and sharing as a means of 
indirect price discrimination. For example, the traditional method of 
distributing scientific articles has been bundling them in issues of 
journals, which, in turn, are distributed mainly to subscribers. This 
method involves two levels of bundling: allowing readers to access all 
the articles bundled in a single issue, and allowing subscribers to 
access all the issues within the subscription period. Digital 
technologies enabled even greater levels of bundling, where users gain 
access to even the larger bundles available through large databases of 
journal articles.  
Common practices are also consistent with the economics of 
indirect price discrimination via sharing. The market for academic 
monographs and specialized reference books tend to be small (relative 
to, say, novels or magazines). It consists of readers with varying and 
idiosyncratic types of uses who might be interested in reading the 
book or sections of it in highly unpredictable ways over long periods of 
time. Moreover, the utility that users derive is often uncertain, and not 
easily internalized by the reader (e.g., in the form of pleasure or by 
charging a client). While developing an effective direct price 
discrimination scheme for this type of literature seems dauntingly 
difficult, if not impossible, publishers can still deploy at least two 
types of indirect price discrimination. Many of these books are sold 
primarily to libraries who allow readers to share them, either through 
lending or through photocopying of excerpts. A library is willing to 
pay a higher price than most of its patrons would be willing to pay 
because it provides patrons a valuable service, and its continued 
funding depends on satisfying the needs of its patrons. In essence, the 
library internalizes the preferences of its patrons and allows the 
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publisher to set a higher price for the book without worrying about 
trying to determine the preferences of individual readers. Effectively, 
these books are meant to be shared and publishers price them 
accordingly. In addition to libraries, select individuals who need 
permanent access to those books or otherwise prefer the benefits that 
are incidental to full ownership of a copy of a book might also be 
willing to pay the typically high price of those books.  
These observations go some way towards explaining why the 
present ecosystem, where market-based remunerated transactions 
constitute only a subset of a much larger number of non-market and 
non-remunerated transactions, has existed for generations, and why 
there is no a priori reason why it could not continue to exist with 
respect to digital content.  
These observations do not imply that the legal rules that facilitate 
sharing (including exhaustion and fair use) necessarily benefit 
copyright owners in every instance. Sharing benefits copyright owners 
unambiguously only when no unpaid use substitutes for paid uses, or 
when the additional profit that result from greater willingness to pay 
for sharable content outweighs the losses from substitution. 
Moreover, the legality of sharing makes it more difficult for the 
publishers to implement direct price discrimination schemes that, if 
practicable, would be even more profitable. When users’ gain merely 
offsets this forgone profit for publishers it has no effect on total 
welfare, but the prospect of gaining this additional profit could, at the 
margin, influence a publisher’s decision whether to invest in a 
particular project or not. Arguably, if lower expected profit 
discourages publishers from investing in otherwise profitable projects, 
readers are harmed as well. If so, then it might be tempting to 
conclude that copyright owners should be granted the power to 
control all sharing; if they expect that the benefits from sharing will be 
greater than the losses of sharing they will rationally allow it, but if the 
sharing interferes with their ability to implement profitable price 
discrimination schemes they will disallow it. For libraries, this implies 
that publishers should be able to fully control what libraries do and to 
what extent.   
As tempting as this view might be, however, it is only attractive if 
one assumes that the interests of publishers and the interests of 
society are constantly aligned. As noted in the earlier discussion, they 
are not. Even if we assume that technology could eliminate all 
technological impediments to efficient market based access to books, 
it cannot eliminate all of the impediments that are endemic to the 
nature of information goods. Moreover, granting copyright owners 
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control over all forms and types of sharing provides no guarantee that 
they will exercise it in benign welfare enhancing ways, rather than in 
ways that strategically maximize profit while reducing overall welfare. 
And once we add the liberal values of democracy and freedom into the 
welfare equation, the inescapable conclusion is that perfect price 
discrimination (even if technically feasible) may not be welfare 
maximizing, because its accomplishment requires a legal 
infrastructure that is inimical to those very values.   
This analysis suggests that if the copyright ecosystem has a public 
purpose, then some of the functions that libraries perform are not 
only fundamental but also indispensable for attaining this purpose. 
Therefore, the legal rules (such as exhaustion and other limitations on 
copyright) that allow libraries to perform these functions are as 
integral to the copyright system as copyright itself.118  
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this Article I presented and challenged the view that the first-
sale doctrine, or exhaustion, applies only to the transfer of tangible 
copies of works from one person to another- but not to the transfer of 
digital files. Under this view, the first-sale doctrine merely exists as a 
statutory exception, and one that limits only the copyright owner’s 
distribution right, but not other rights. It protects defendants who can 
show that their acts fall within the bounds of the statutory exception, 
but any incongruence with the statutory exception would be fatal to 
their defense. This view, in turn, depends on certain assumptions 
about the meaning of the several exclusive rights, the meaning of the 
first-sale doctrine, and what the interaction among them entails. I 
demonstrated that none of these assumptions is self-evident. The law 
on digital exhaustion is anything but settled, and is capable of being 
interpreted differently. As a “first sale” doctrine it may limit only the 
distribution right, but its statutory presence might merely affirm a 
broader principle of exhaustion—one of several principles in copyright 
law that limit the copyright owner’s powers. The principle of 
exhaustion can apply, and at times has been applied, beyond the 
distribution right.  
I also showed that copyright owners’ ability to escape exhaustion 
by characterizing transactions as “licenses” rather than “sales”, or by 
using contracts to exercise downstream control is hardly a foregone 
118 Compare CCH v. LSUC, [2004] S.C.C. 13 (Can.). 
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conclusion. Established precedent and sound legal principle indicate 
that while the law recognizes some scope for contracting around 
exhaustion, courts will not necessarily uphold any private reordering 
of the respective legal entitlements of copyright owners and users. 
How those principles will apply to digital exhaustion is, at most, 
unsettled. I argued that the doctrine of restraint of trade provides a 
well-known (albeit somewhat neglected) legal framework for 
distinguishing between those limitations on exhaustion that are 
reasonable and justified and those that are not.  
While these observations and conclusions apply to exhaustion 
generally, they apply most demonstrably in the case of libraries. 
Libraries occupy a privileged space in the copyright system. 
Historically, libraries predate copyright, and the institutional role of 
libraries and institutions of higher learning in the “promotion of 
science” and the “encouragement of learning” was acknowledged 
before legislators decided to grant authors exclusive rights in their 
writings. The historical precedence of libraries and the legal 
recognition of their public function cannot determine every 
contemporary copyright question, but this historical fact is not devoid 
of legal consequence. History is part of the legislative history of 
statutes, and it constitutes part of the context that informs the 
interpretation of current statutes. Specifically, if one proffered 
interpretation of the Copyright Act threatens to seriously curtail the 
function of libraries, courts should require a clear indication that this 
was the intended goal of the legislation before adopting it. Taken 
together, the first parts of this Article demonstrate that the conclusion 
that the current legislation does not allow digital exhaustion is at least 
questionable, if not false.  
Looking forward, whether digital exhaustion should be preserved 
or permitted depends, in the case of libraries, on understanding their 
function, and how they might be impacted by digital technologies. In 
analyzing the role of libraries in facilitating non-market access to 
books, I identified three types of impediments to efficient market-
based access: technology contingent impediments, endemic 
impediments, and strategic impediments. I noted that technological 
changes might only lead publishers to develop market-based models 
of access that are technology contingent, but market-based models 
aren’t likely to displace the role of libraries when libraries address 
endemic or strategic impediments. More specifically, I explained why 
digital technologies and the abolition of exhaustion would not result 
in perfect price discrimination, and that exhaustion has not and will 
not prevent publishers from continuing to implement indirect 
2016] KATZ 123 
methods of price discrimination. Since giving publishers greater 
powers to implement imperfect modes of price discrimination will not 
necessarily lead to superior outcomes relative to the current 
ecosystem, there is no a priori reason to assume that eliminating 
digital exhaustion will increase social welfare. In fact, because profit-
maximizing publishers will prefer models that increase their private 
returns while ignoring the long-term effects on society, the prudent 
assumption is that eliminating digital exhaustion will not increase 
social welfare. Libraries, institutionally designed to consider the 
collective long-term benefits of access to knowledge would therefore 
continue to play an indispensable role in providing access to works in 
digital formats, and policy-makers should insist that strong evidence 
be presented before they are willing to discard this assumption.  
As long as the copyright ecosystem has a public purpose, then 
some of the functions that libraries perform are not only fundamental 
but also indispensable for attaining this purpose. Therefore, the legal 
rules (such as exhaustion and other limitations on copyright) that 
allow libraries to perform these functions remain, and will continue to 
be, as integral to the copyright system as the copyright itself. 

